Abstract. The overall structure is one of the most important properties of block ciphers. At present, the most common structures include Feistel structure, SP structure, MISTY structure, L-M structure and Generalized Feistel structure. In [29] , Choy et al. proposed a new structure called GF-NLFSR (Generalized Feistel-NonLinear Feedback Shift Register), and designed a new block cipher called Four-Cell which is based on the 4-cell GF-NLFSR. In this paper, we first study properties of the ncell GF-NLFSR structure, and prove that for an n-cell GF-NLFSR, there exists an (n 2 + n − 2) rounds impossible differential. Then we present an impossible differential attack on the full 25-round Four-Cell using this kind of 18-round impossible differential distinguisher together with differential cryptanalysis technique. The data complexity of our attack is 2 111.5 and the time complexity is less than 2 123.5 encryptions. In addition, we expect the attack to be more efficient when the relations between different round subkeys can be exploited by taking the key schedule algorithm into consideration.
Introduction
The overall structure is one of the most important properties of block ciphers, and it plays important roles in the round number choice, software and hardware implementation performances and so on. At present, the most often used structures include Feistel structure, SP structure, MISTY structure, L-M structure and Generalized Feistel structure. Feistel structure was introduced by H. Feistel in the design of Lucifer block cipher and later got famous since it was used in the design of DES. Feistel structure can transfer any function (usually called round function F ) to a permutation. Now there are a lot of block ciphers employing the Feistel structure, such as Camellia, FEAL, GOST, LOKI, E2, Blowfish, RC5 and so on. The security of Feistel structure against differential and linear cryptanalysis was evaluated by many researchers, for example [1] [2] [3] , and meanwhile there are many results such as [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] about the pseudorandomness of Feistel structure. Besides the Feistel structure, the other most often used structure is the SP structure, the well known block ciphers such as AES, Serpent and ARIA all employ the SP structure. In each round of the SP structure, first a layer of key-dependent inversive function named S is applied to the input, and then applies a permutation or an inversive linear transformation named P . Hence the SP structure is very simple and clear, and S is usually called the confusion layer which achieves confusion in the cipher and P is usually referred to as the diffusion layer which diffuses efficiently. MISTY structure is another kind of important structures which was proposed by M. Matsui in [11] , and it was used in the design of the block ciphers MISTY [12] and KASUMI [13] . There are many results about the security analysis of the MISTY structure such as in [14] [15] [16] [17] . S. Vaudenay et al. named the structure of the block cipher IDEA as the L-M structure or Lai-Massey structure [18] , and the FOX [19] cipher also employs a variant of the L-M structure. The generalized Feistel structure was first introduced by B. Schneier and J. Kelsey which can be considered as an unbalanced Feistel structure, and then many variants of generalized Feistel structure are proposed such as CAST-256-type Feistel structure, MARS-type Feistel structure, CLEFIA-type Feistel structure, SMS4-type Feistel structure and so on. All these kinds of generalized Feistel structures have similar advantages such as decryption -encryption similarity and the inverse of round function is not necessary in decryption. Furthermore, this can make the design of round function more simple and flexible. The security analysis of generalized Feistel structure is very important when they are used to design new block ciphers, and there are many results [25] [26] [27] [28] about the security of different kinds of generalized Feistel structures against the differential and linear cryptanalysis and also their pseudorandomness.
In [29] , Choy et al. proposed a new structure called GF-NLFSR (Generalized Feistel-NonLinear Feedback Shift Register). It can be considered as an n-cell extension of combining the MISTY structure and Generalized Unbalanced Feistel Network together. The security of the structure against many attacks such as differential, linear, impossible differential and integral cryptanalysis are also considered in [29] . For an n-cell GF-NLFSR, an upper bound for the differential and linear hull probabilities for any n + 1 rounds are given, and a 2n − 1 rounds impossible differential distinguisher and a 3n − 1 rounds integral distinguisher on the n-cell GF-NLFSR are demonstrated. Furthermore, a new block cipher called Four-Cell which is based on the 4-cell GF-NLFSR was designed in [29] . The block and key size of Four-Cell are both 128-bit, and there are 25 rounds in total. Impossible differential cryptanalysis [30] was first proposed by Biham, Biryukov and Shamir in 1999, and it was applied to analyze the Skipjack block cipher. Unlike differential cryptanalysis which exploits differentials with the highest possible probability, impossible differential cryptanalysis uses the differentials which hold with probability 0, which can thus be called impossible differential. The impossible differentials can usually be built in a miss-in-the-middle manner. Recently, impossible differential cryptanalysis had received worldwide attention, and its application to block ciphers such as AES, Camellia and MISTY all achieved very good results [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] .
In [29] , Proposition 3 stated that for an n-cell GF-NLFSR, there exist at most 2n − 1 rounds impossible differential distinguishers using the U-method proposed in [36] . However, we examine the property of n-cell GF-NLFSR structure and demonstrate that there exists a (n 2 +n−2) rounds impossible differential distinguisher. Then we present an impossible differential attack on the full 25-round Four-Cell using this kind of 18-round impossible differential distinguisher together with differential cryptanalysis technique. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give a brief description of the n-cell GF-NLFSR structure and Four-Cell block cipher. In Section 3, we describe some useful properties of the n-cell GF-NLFSR structure and the (n 2 + n − 2) rounds impossible differential. Then in Section 4, we present our impossible differential attack on the full 25-round Four-Cell block cipher. Finally, in Section 5 we summarize this paper.
2 The n-Cell GF-NLFSR Structure and Four-Cell Block Cipher
The n-Cell GF-NLFSR Structure
In this section, we will give a brief description of the n-cell GF-NLFSR structure, and Fig. 1 below illustrates one round of GF-NLFSR.
For an n-cell GF-NLFSR structure, suppose the size of the internal sub-block is m-bit, and then we can denote the mn-bit input block as (
If we denote the round subkey as sk, then the output of one round n-cell GF-NLFSR transformation is defined as follows.
where the output block is denoted as (x 2 , x 3 , ..., x n , x n+1 ) ∈ ({0, 1} m ) n . Note here the symbol ⊕ is used to denote finite field addition (XOR) over GF (2) m , and the function f : {0,
m is the round function. Specifically, for each fixed round key sk, the round function f (·, sk) : {0, 1} m → {0, 1} m must be a permutation, or else the n-cell GF-NLFSR structure is not able to decrypt correctly. Therefore, in our later analysis, we will assume the round function f is a permutation when the round key is fixed.
Four-Cell Block Cipher
The block and key size of Four-Cell are both 128-bit, and it uses the 4-cell GF-NLFSR structure. Since the designers only give a rough suggestion for the key schedule algorithm, namely using a similar cipher with 26 rounds to generate the round keys needed. Hence in this paper, we will omit the key schedule and
Fig. 1. One Round of n-Cell GF-NLFSR structure just assume that the round keys are randomly chosen. The encryption algorithm of Four-Cell can be described briefly as follows.
Let the plaintext be denoted by P = (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 ) ∈ ({0, 1} 32 ) 4 , then after applying the full 25 rounds encryption, the 128-bit ciphertext can be denoted
32 ) 4 denote the input of the i-th round, then the output of the i-th round can be computed as follows.
For rounds i = 1, 2, .., 5 and i = 21, 22, .., 25, the round keys are denoted as sk i ∈ {0, 1} 32 and the round function is defined as
. For rounds i = 6, 7, .., 20, the round keys are denoted as
32 ) 2 , and the round function is defined as
Here in each round function, S : ({0, 1}
is four parallel 8 × 8 s-boxes, and the s-box is similar with the s-box used in the SubBytes operation in AES. The transformation M DS : ({0, 1}
4 is a 4-byte to 4-byte maximal distance separable transform with optimal branch number 5, and it is similar with the MixColumn operation in AES. In the end, the output after 25 rounds is XORed with a 128-bit post-whitening key
Differential Property of the n-Cell GF-NLFSR Structure
For the n-cell GF-NLFSR structure, we can express the nm-bit input as n words which consists of m bits each. Suppose we have a pair of plaintexts
n ), and their difference is denoted by ∆X = (∆x 1 , ∆x 2 , ..., ∆x n ), where
Note the symbol 0 in the difference ∆X = (∆x 1 , ∆x 2 , ∆x 3 , 0, ..., 0) means that the corresponding byte difference is zero.
Lemma 1.
For the n-cell GF-NLFSR structure, there exists the following n rounds differential characteristic whose probability is equal to 1.
We denote this kind of differential characteristic as ∆ i , where 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, and these differential characteristics ∆ i satisfy the following two properties.
Proof. Let the round function of Round
Then when the round key sk i is fixed, the round function f ski must be a permutation, or else one can not decrypt correctly for the n-cell GF-NLFSR structure. According to the structure of the n-cell GF-NLFSR, we can get the following equations which is illustrated in Table 1 .
(1) Table 1 . The n rounds differential characteristic of the n-cell GF-NLFSR structure
According to Equ. (3), the following one round differential characteristic will hold with probability 1.
Similarly, we can know that all the differential characteristics from Round (i+2) to Round n in Table 1 hold with probability 1. Therefore, for the n-cell GF-NLFSR structure, there exists the following n rounds differential characteristic and its probability is equal to 1.
Then according to Equ. (3), we can easily get the first property, i.e. ∆y 1 ⊕ ∆y 2 ⊕ ... ⊕ ∆y i ⊕ ∆y i+1 = 0. Therefore, in the following we only need to prove the second property.
According to Equ. (2) and Equ. (3), we can get the following equation.
When ∆x i = 0, we can conclude that f ski (x i ) ⊕ f ski (x i ⊕ ∆x i ) = 0 since the function f ski is a permutation. Therefore, we get the second property, namely if ∆x i = 0, then ∆y i+1 = 0.
Lemma 2. For the inverse of the n-cell GF-NLFSR structure which is denoted
as the n-cell GF-NLFSR −1 structure, there exists the following (2n − 2) rounds differential characteristic whose probability is equal to 1. Proof. According to the structure of the n-cell GF-NLFSR −1 , we can get the following one round differential characteristic which holds with probability 1, and this kind of differential is illustrated in Table 2. (β, β, 0, ..., 0)
We denote this kind of differential characteristic as ∆
Similarly, all the differential characteristics from the Round 2 to Round (n−1) in Table 2 all hold with probability 1. Then in the Round n, if we denote the round function as g n , then b 1 = g n (z) ⊕ g n (z ⊕ β). Because the difference β is non-zero and the function g n is a permutation, we can conclude that b 1 = 0. Similarly, in the (n + 1)-th round we have b 2 = g n+1 (w) ⊕ g n+1 (w ⊕ b 1 ), and thus we can conclude that b 2 = 0 since b 1 = 0.
Finally, according to the property of the n-cell GF-NLFSR −1 structure, the differential characteristics from Round (n + 2) to Round (2n − 2) in Table 2 all hold with probability 1. Therefore, for the n-cell GF-NLFSR −1 structure, there exists the following differential characteristic whose probability is equal to 1. 
Proof. This kind of (n 2 + n − 2) rounds impossible differential is constructed using the miss-in-the-middle technique. First we construct an n(n − 1) rounds differential characteristic of the encryption direction and an (2n − 2) rounds differential characteristic of the decryption direction whose probabilities are both equal to 1. Then if these two differential characteristics contradict each other in the middle, we get the (n 2 + n − 2) rounds impossible differential. In Table 3 we illustrate this kind of impossible differential in detail.
When we choose the input difference as (α, 0, ..., 0), we can construct an n(n − 1) rounds differential with probability 1 as follows. First of all, based on Lemma 1, we can construct the following n rounds differential ∆ 1 whose probability is equal to 1. By concatenating the above differentials together, we can get the following n(n − 1) rounds differential whose probability is equal to 1 and ∆x n n is non-zero. 
In the decryption direction, considering the inverse structure n-cell GF-NLFSR −1 , we get the following 2n − 2 rounds differential characteristic with probability 1 according to Lemma 2. If we concatenate the above n(n − 1) rounds differential of the encryption direction and the (2n−2) rounds differential of the decryption direction together, we can construct the following (n 2 + n − 2) rounds impossible differential since they contradict each other at ∆x 
Security Analysis of Four-Cell Block Cipher
According to Theorem 1, for Four-Cell block cipher which employs the 4-cell GF-NLFSR structure, there exists an 18 rounds impossible differential as follows. 
The attack procedure is illustrated in Fig. 2 
Then for the last three rounds of Four-Cell, we have the following equations.
If we denote rk 25 26, 4 , then the input of the Sbox layer for Round 25 can be computed as follows.
Similarly, we can denote rk 24 26, 3 , and compute the input of the Sbox layer for Round 24 as follows. 
Therefore, considering that ∆x 23 = ∆y 23 , ∆x 24 = ∆y 24 , ∆x 25 = ∆y 25 and ∆x 26 = ∆c 1 , we can obtain the values of (∆x 23 , ∆x 24 , ∆x 25 , ∆x 26 ) by just computing the values of y 25 , y 24 and y 23 for a pair of ciphertexts C = (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 ) and
). For the first four rounds of Four-Cell, if we choose the plaintext difference as (∆x 1 , ∆x 2 , ∆x 3 , ∆x 4 ) = (0, 0, 0, α), then we can get the following equations.
Here, ∆x 8 = 0 holds if and only if S(x 4 ⊕sk 4 )⊕S(x 4 ⊕α⊕sk 4 ) = M DS −1 (α). Because the branch number of M DS is 5, there is at most one passive byte of α. For simplicity, we can assume the last byte of α is passive.
Let
and then we will use the symbol α S ←→ β to express that there exists
Therefore, we can choose a set A which is defined as follows.
Note here the necessary condition for α S ←→ M DS −1 (α) is that α 1 , α 2 , and α 3 should satisfy a linear relation (e.g. for the MDS used in AES, the linear relation is 0b · α 1 ⊕ 0d · α 2 ⊕ 09 · α 3 = 0). Furthermore, for the Sbox of Four-Cell, the probability of α i S ←→ β i holds is about 2 −1 for ∀β i ∈ {0, 1} 8 . Therefore, the set A contains about |A| ≈ (2
13 possible values. We also test this estimation using computer program, and with the same MDS and the Sbox used in AES, our searching result shows that the set A contains 7965 ≈ 2 12.96 possible values of α which is very close to the theory estimation. After analyzing the first four rounds and the last three rounds of Four-Cell, we can set the 18-round impossible differential at Round 5 to Round 22 and apply an impossible differential attack on the full 25-round Four-Cell. The attack procedure consists of three steps, and we will utilize impossible differential attack technique together with some properties of the structure.
The first step of the attack is data collection. We first choose appropriate plaintext structures defined as follows. a 2 , a 3 , x 4 )}, where a 1 , a 2 , a 3 are 32-bit constants and the last byte of x 4 is also an 8-bit constants, namely x 4 = (x 41 , x 42 , x 43 , a 44 ) ∈ ({0, 1} 8 ) 4 , x 4j ∈ {0, 1} 8 . Therefore, each structure contains 2 24 plaintexts and they can construct about 2 24 ×2 13 /2 ≈ 2 36 useful pairs whose plaintext differences satisfy the conditions listed above. The second step of the attack is data filtering, in which we will discard all the useless pairs which do not satisfy the corresponding ciphertext difference. Note the output difference after the impossible differential distinguisher is (∆x 23 , ∆x 24 , ∆x 25 , ∆x 26 ) = (β, β, 0, 0), and according to the structure of FourCell, the ciphertext difference (∆c 1 , ∆c 2 , ∆c 3 , ∆c 4 ) = (∆x 26 , ∆x 27 , ∆x 28 , ∆x 29 ) should satisfy the following two conditions.
Therefore, the probability of a pair remains after this filtering is about 2 −64 . The third step of the attack is key recovery. First of all, for each guess of (sk 41 , sk 42 , sk 43 ) we can partially encrypt Round 4 to check if a pair satisfies the distinguisher. Note for each plaintext pair X = (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 ) and
, a useful pair must satisfy that the output difference of the round function in Round 4 equals to the input difference x 4 ⊕ x * 4 . Therefore, based on this property we can discard some useless pairs to reduce the complexity in the following steps, and the probability of a pair remains after this filtering is about 2 −21 . Then for all the remained pairs, we guess the values of rk 25 and rk 24 to decrypt Round 25 and Round 24 respectively. At last we recover the value of rk 23 by differential techniques. Then we can discard all the wrong subkey guesses using the impossible differential sieving techniques.
In the following, we will describe the attack procedure in detail.
1. Data Collection: Choose 2 m structures and each structure is constructed as follows: 
Note for the remaining pairs we have ∆y 25 = 0, and y * 
iii. encryptions. Therefore, the total time complexity of the attack is less than 2 123.5
encryptions.
Conclusion
In [29] , Choy et al proposed a new structure called GF-NLFSR (Generalized Feistel-NonLinear Feedback Shift Register), and also examined the security of the structure against many attacks such as differential, linear, impossible differential and integral cryptanalysis. Furthermore, they designed a new block cipher called Four-Cell which is based on 4-cell GF-NLFSR structure. In this paper, we proved that for n-cell GF-NLFSR structure there exists (n 2 + n − 2) rounds impossible differential. Then using this kind of 18-round impossible differential distinguisher together with some novel differential and impossible differential cryptanalysis techniques, we presented an impossible differential attack on the full 25-round Four-Cell. The data complexity of our attack is 2 111.5 and the time complexity is less than 2 123.5 encryptions. In addition, we expect the attack to be more efficient when the relations between different round subkeys can be exploited by taking the key scheduling algorithm into consideration.
Compared with the other kinds of generalized Feistel strucutres, the n-cell GF-NLFSR structure has some obvious advantage such as the ability of being parallel. However, if it is used to design a new block cipher, more work still need to be done about the security of the structure against various cryptanalysis and its pseudorandomness. 
